"In his earlier volume, Tradition and Authenticity in the Search for Ecumenic Wisdom, Thomas Langan explored the distinctive kinds of truth handed on by explicit traditions and raised the question of integrating these many diverse truth claims into a responsible, meaningful vision of reality. In Being and Truth, the author lays a foundation for this concept: a theory of knowledge and a theory of being that can find a place for all these differing realities. Although experience is (...) always interpreted in the light of our traditions, Being and Truth shows that this does not preclude real access to persons, things, and their interrelationships." "Balancing the realities of subjectivism with the demands of objective form and structure, giving both the relatively permanent and the ephemeral their due, is at every moment delicate. The "common sense" at the core of each person's "natural faith" must serve as a guide - yet neither of these is a simple notion. Langan unabashedly calls on his own wide-ranging experience of the lived world to illustrate this dialectic. Students and scholars of political philosophy, intellectual history, and theology will benefit from this rich and insightful text, which integrates historicity without undermining the possibility of attaining lasting truth."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

The author interprets the ethical theory of St. Thomas Aquinas as a kind of deontological intuitionism. Although the concept of the supreme good or beatitude does not serve as the criterion of right action, it is shown that it does play an important role as a guiding and unifying thread in the life of the human agent.

Studies the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and his influence on Protestant theology, philology, and on literary and philosophical history and criticism in Europe.

An exegesis of Heidegger's existentialist philosophy.

here was a brief inaugural session of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness during the Psychonomic Society Conference in Los Angeles in November 1995, but the first full conference of the Association was held this June in the very pleasant surroundings of the Claremont Colleges. Being at this conference was very different from being at ‘Tucson II’ the previous year. This was a less ballyhooed, more intimate event, maybe less exciting, and less intellectually eclectic, but also perhaps more (...) conducive to serious scientific exchange. Certainly the roster of speakers was replete with luminaries of the consciousness studies movement, and highly respected names from psychology, neuroscience and philosophy: Christof Koch, Bernard Baars, Ned Block, Philip Merikle, Daniel Schacter, Larry Jacoby, Walter Freeman, Valerie Hardcastle, both Churchlands, Melvyn Goodale, Owen Flanagan . . . to unfairly pick out just a few. (shrink)

As the technological phenomenon known as the worldwide web permeates civilization, it creates some cultures and destroys others. In this pioneering book, philosopher Thomas Langan explores "virtual reality"Can inherently contradictory phrase"and the effects of technology on our very being. In our present-day high- technology environment, making simple, everyday decisions is difficult because the virtual world we've created doesn't necessarily operate according to the old "common sense." To retain our intellectual fitness, we must, Langan argues, consider these essential (...) questions: If virtual reality is, in fact, reality, what is this life that we are caught up in? What is _being_ within the context of virtual reality? How can we establish a system for distinguishing truth from fiction? Although technology minimizes distances between people and makes the information they seek more accessible, it simultaneously blurs the line dividing fact from falsehood and real from virtual. An individual's intellectual survival is threatened as technological advancement challenges our collective understanding of what reality is. Because much of the information that is presented as fact simply works to fulfill a specific agenda, we cannot accept as truth everything that appears on the internet or in the media. To survive, we must learn to manage our lives and resources despite the flood of information we are bombarded with daily. Addressing the general educated reader, _Surviving the Age of Virtual Reality_ expertly interweaves the worlds of technology and philosophy, pushing the analysis of this technological and human phenomenon to new depths. (shrink)

Un idéal est un besoin qu'on n'a pas les moyens de satisfaire immédiatement; tout idéal fait done appel à la création de moyens. Certains idéaux sont éventuellement réalisés une fois pour toutes et cessent ainsi d'opérer comme idéaux. Certains sont simplement inépuisables; ils ne peuvent pas être accomplis une fois pour toutes — soit, comme la beauté, qu'ils ne se satisfassent pas d'une réalisation particulière; soit, comme l'éducation libérale, que leur limite recule au fur et à mesure qu'on s'en rapproche. (...) D'énormes institutions culturelles et traditionnelles se créent alors pour traduire l'effort par lequel l'homme tend vers eux. Dans une société où manque le nécessaire — nourriture, logement, vêtement — l'acquisition et la distribution des produits alimentaires monopolisent tellement l'attention des dirigeants que les besoins culturels y inspirent rarement des programmes d'action à longue portée. Les rites religieux ne font pas exception comme on pourrait le croire: le besoin de se concilier les dieux qui règlent un monde mystérieux et terrifiant est ressenti comme urgent; mais les moyens de l'assouvir, rituels et magiques, ne manquent pas. Ce besoin-là est vite satisfait, et done ne sert pas, dans ces conditions primitives, d'idéal capable de fonder un programme à longue éehéance, des institutions compliquées; ce n'est pas un but lointain dans l'accomplissement duquel concourent les efforts de générations successives. (shrink)

Langan argues that we must struggle toward a unity of discourse respectful of genuine experiences of varying civilizations if we are to live peacefully on one planet.

"Langan draws on a lifetime of study to offer a new understanding of the central question of our existence, turning to phenomenology and philosophical anthropology to help us better understand who we are as individuals and communities and what makes us act the way we do"--Provided by publisher.

The question of "the sense of it all" is usually interpreted against the background of Christian theology of history and of its paradoxical offspring, Marxist philosophy of history. Both have proposed clear-cut and absolute interpretations of "the sense of it all." Those who reject either sort of construction tend to carry over their suspicion to any project of searching in history for sense in any sense of the term. For this reason, "substantive" philosophy of history has fallen on fallow days.

Dray restricts himself in Laws and Explanations in History to a cautious examination of the popular "covering law theory" of historical explanation and of the sense of "causal explanation" as applied to history. He deftly dialogues in their own terms with those who would make the end of history the subsuming of particular incidents under general laws, carefully marshalling evidence to show that what such theorists treat as "exceptions" actually go to prove that the interest and validity of history lie (...) much closer to the particular event than to the general explanation. (shrink)

Some sort of resistant, some kind of "given" with which the "Self" must struggle, is lurking in each of these suggestions. A quick survey of them seems to suggest that at least four categories of "givens" must be taken into account in the struggle of self-realization. 1) There is a primordial level of "givenness," consisting of the fixed structures of our "nature" and of those of our inherited temperament; 2) there is all that is subsequently, historically acquired--cultural habits, dispositions, and (...) conceptions; 3) there is the style, built-up of our whole personal past unified by our fundamental projections; 4) finally, there is a kind of given that is unqualifiedly "other," that is entirely outside of me: the other people, the institutions, and the things encountered in my situation. (shrink)